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Abstract
Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic selection mechanism is a probability distribu-
tion over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is incentive-compatible (IC), if the probability
assigned to a vertex does not change when we alter its outgoing edge (or even remove it). The
quality of a selection mechanism is the worst-case ratio between the expected progeny under
the mechanism’s distribution and the maximal progeny in the forest. In this paper we prove
an upper bound of 4/5 and a lower bound of 1/ ln 16 ≈ 0.36 for the quality of any IC selection
mechanism. The lower bound is achieved by two novel mechanisms and is a significant im-
provement to the results of [7]. The first, simpler mechanism, has the nice feature of generating
distributions which are fair (i.e., monotone and proportional). The downside of this mechanism
is that it is not exact (i.e., the probabilities might sum-up to less than 1). Our second, more
involved mechanism, is exact but not fair. We also prove an impossibility for an IC mechanism
that is both exact and fair and has a positive quality.
1 Introduction
Incentive-compatible selection mechanisms have been studied before in different settings (see Sec-
tion 1.1). The motivation for this research stems from many scenarios in which agents approve /
disapprove each other, and an administrator is required to select one or more ‘worthy’ agents. To
name a few examples:
1. The selection of a prize winner in an academic field according to peer reviews.
2. The selection of an influential user in a social network.
3. Web search engines select central web-pages by links from other web-pages.
In all of the above examples, the agents have an incentive to misreport their true appreciation or
interest in others, if that will lead to their own selection. An incentive-compatible (IC) selection
mechanism, is a selection mechanism that guarantees that the selection of an agent is independent
of his own out-links. A probabilistic selection mechanism assigns each agent a selection-probability.
The requirement of IC for a probabilistic mechanism is that the probability assigned to an agent
will be independent of his own out-links. Selection mechanisms differ in their purpose—some try to
∗This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no 740435).
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maximize a specific graph theoretic measure of the selected agent (most commonly the in-degree)
while others guarantee some set of properties (e.g., an agent with a unanimous support is selected,
an agent with no support is not selected).
In this paper we search for IC, probabilistic selection mechanisms that maximize the expected
progeny1 of the selected agent. We assume that the given network has the structure of a forest;
that is, the maximal out-degree is one, and there are no cycles. This network structure arises
naturally in cases where the agents join the network sequentially and are allowed to connect to at
most one of the users who preceded them. For example, if the agents are customers and a link
from customer x to customer y denotes that customer y is the one who referred/recommended the
service to customer x, then we get a structure of a forest. In this example, selecting a customer with
high progeny means that we are interested in a customer which brought many new customers, both
directly (his own sons in the forest) and indirectly (deeper levels in his sub-tree). This example is
closely related to mechanisms of multi-level marketing payments (e.g., [12, 5, 1, 11]).
There are two additional properties of a probabilistic selection mechanism which we consider as
desirable. The first is that with probability 1 the mechanism selects an agent (i.e., that the sum
of probabilities in any forest is exactly 1). A mechanism with this property is called an exact
mechanism. The second property is that the mechanism will be fair. The requirement of fairness is
twofold: (a) monotonicity: higher progeny leads to higher selection-probability; (b) proportionality:
the ratio between the selection-probabilities of two agents depends only on their progenies. See
Definition 4 for a formal definition of these notions.
We present two novel IC probabilistic selection mechanisms with a similar worst-case expected
progeny-approximation of about 1/3. The first mechanism is fair, but not exact. The second
mechanism is exact, but not fair. We then prove an impossibility theorem which states that there
are no IC selection mechanisms that are both exact and fair, and with a positive expected progeny-
approximation.
1.1 Related work and our contribution
Broadly speaking, our paper relates to the track of works on approximate mechanism design without
money ([17], [10], [6]). The goal in these works is to offer mechanisms that provide strategy-proof
solutions to problems that have an exact optimal solution which is not strategy-proof (e.g., facility
allocation). Naturally, strategyproofness comes at the expense of optimality, and the challenge is
to bound this loss.
Of those papers who deal with the problem of IC selection in networks, the most similar to ours is
[7]. In that paper, the authors offer several IC probabilistic selection mechanisms for trees, forests,
and acyclic graphs. They offer a mechanism for forests for which the ratio between the expected
progeny and the maximal progeny is proportional to n/P ∗r; P ∗ being the maximal progeny, n the
number of agents and r the number of roots in the forest. Clearly this ratio is not bounded from
below by any positive number.2 Hence, our two mechanisms which guarantee a ratio of at least
1/3 for any forest are a substantial improvement.
The work in [2] was the first to present the model of IC selection mechanisms in networks, striving
to optimize the sum of in-degrees of the selected set. They proved a strong impossibility for an
IC deterministic mechanism and offered a probabilistic mechanism based on the idea to randomly
partition the agents to voters and candidates. This mechanism does not give a good bound on the
1The progeny of a vertex in a network is the number of vertices with paths to this vertex. In a forest, the progeny
is the order of the subtree underneath the vertex. See the formal definition in the beginning of Section 2.
2For instance, in a forest with one star of order n/2 and n/2 singleton vertices, this yields a ratio of 4/n, which
goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
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progeny of the selected agent. Further works with better mechanisms or slightly different setting
can be found in [13, 9, 8, 15].
Several works have offered an axiomatic approach to the problem. In these works the authors
define a set of desirable axioms and investigate the possibility/impossibility of mechanisms that
fulfil maximal subsets of these axioms. To name a few examples of these works, [14, 16, 4].
In [3] the authors considered the possibility of complete ranking mechanisms under certain axioms.
Our contribution and paper organization. In this paper we investigate IC, probabilistic selection
mechanisms for forests. We measure the quality of a mechanism as the worst-case ratio between
the expected progeny of the selection and the maximal progeny in the forest. The exact model
and the formal definitions are in Section 2. Maximizing for the progeny is significantly harder than
maximizing for the in-degree, since the dependence on a single edge is potentially much larger.
The mechanism offered in [7] gives a positive bound on the progeny approximation provided the
trees in the forest are balanced (the average of their orders is not too far from the maximal order).
In Section 3 we suggest two novel mechanisms with a progeny approximation of about 1/3 for
all forests. None of these mechanisms is superior to the other; each has a desirable property not
present in the other—one of them is fair and the other is exact.
2 Preliminaries
A directed forest is an acyclic, directed graph with maximal out-degree 1. Let N be a set of n
vertices, and let F (N,E) be a directed forest on N . The roots of F are those vertices which do not
have an out-edge; we denote these vertices by R(F ). For a vertex x ∈ N , we denote by T (x;F )
the subtree of F in which x is the root. We denote by P (x;F ) = |T (x;F )|, the progeny of x, and
by P ∗(F ) = max
x∈N
P (x;F ) = max
x∈R(F )
P (x;F ), the maximal progeny in F .
We will often use the structure of a star in our proofs. A k-star is a tree with one centre vertex
(the root) and k − 1 leaf vertices. When we speak of an isolated vertex we mean a vertex with no
out-edge and no in-edges.
Let FN be the family of all directed forests on N . A selection mechanism is a function M : N ×
FN → [0, 1] such that for every F ∈ FN , ∑
x∈N
M(x, F ) ≤ 1. We abuse notation and denote a series
of mechanisms {M}∞|N |=1 by just M. We think of M(·, F ) as a probability distribution over N ,
with the possibility of no-selection. The probability of no selection is M(∅, F ) = 1− ∑
x∈N
M(x, F ).
When the forest is obvious from the context, we might omit the extra parameter everywhere and
just write: R,P ∗, T (x), P (x),M(x).
In this paper we look at mechanisms which are Incentive-Compatible (IC). Incentive-compatibility
means that for any two forests F,F ′ ∈ FN and a vertex x ∈ N such that F,F ′ differ only on
the out-edge of x, M(x;F ) =M(x;F ′). Denote by Fx the forest we get from F by removing the
out-edge of x (if any).
Claim 1. Mechanism M is Incentive-Compatible if and only if for any forest F and for any vertex
x ∈ N , M(x;F ) =M(x;Fx).
Proof. IfM is IC, then by definitionM(x;F ) =M(x;Fx) for any x, F . On the other hand, if this
condition holds, then for any x and F,F ′ that differ only on the out-edge of x,M(x;F ) =M(x;Fx)
and M(x;F ′) =M(x;F ′x). But Fx = F ′x (since F,F ′ differ only on the out-edge of x), and hence
M(x;F ) =M(x;F ′), which means that M is IC.
A nice consequence of this view of incentive compatibility is that in order to define an IC
mechanism, it is enough to define the probabilities assigned to the roots in every forest.
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Corollary 2. Let MR be a mechanism that distributes probabilities on the roots of every forest.
Then there is at most one way to extend it to an IC selection mechanism.
Proof. Let M be an IC mechanism that extends MR. For any F, x, if x is a root then M(x;F ) =
MR(x;F ). Otherwise, by Claim 1, M(x;F ) =M(x;Fx) =MR(x;Fx) since x is a root in Fx. In
any case, the probability of x is determined by MR.
Not every roots-distribution mechanism is extendible to an IC selection mechanism. For exam-
ple, the mechanism that always gives the root with highest progeny (with lexicographic tie-breaking)
a probability of 0.6 leads to an IC extension which distributes more than 1 already in a forest with
a single edge.3 When we present our two mechanisms in Section 3 we will first define their roots-
probabilities and then prove that their IC extensions are well-defined.
Of course, there are many IC mechanisms. For instance, the empty mechanism which gives a
probability of 0 to all vertices in any forest, or the uniform mechanism which gives a probability of
1/n to all vertices in any forest. Our goal is to find mechanisms with a good approximation for the
maximal progeny, in the worst-case. In this sense, the optimal mechanism is the one which gives a
probability of 1 to the vertex with the highest progeny. This mechanism cannot be IC, though. Take
for instance the two forests in Figure 1. The IC requirement implies that M(a;F1) = M(a;F2).
However, in F2, P (a;F2) = 3 =
1
2P (b;F2). This simple example shows that we cannot avoid
distributing at least part of the probability to vertices with progeny at most half of the highest
progeny.
a b
F1
a b
F2
Figure 1:
We define the quality of mechanism M for the forest F to be its normalized expected progeny:
Q(M;F ) := E[P (x)]x∼M(F )
P ∗(F )
=
∑
x∈N M(x;F ) · P (x;F )
P ∗(F )
.
Then the quality of the mechanism is:
Q(M) = lim
|N |→∞
min
F∈FN
Q(M;F ).
In Section 3 we will show two IC mechanisms for which Q(M) ≥ 1/3. These are subtle mecha-
nisms, as even coming up with a mechanism with a positive quality is non-trivial. Clearly, for any
mechanism, Q(M) ≤ 1. In the following proposition we bound it away from 1.
Proposition 3. For any IC mechanism M, Q(M) ≤ 4/5.
Proof. Consider the two forests on two vertices in Figure 2.
To the left of each vertex we have denoted its probability by a generic IC mechanism. Notice
that we have used a symmetry assumption when we assumed that in F1 the vertices get equal
3If x is the first vertex in the lexicographic order, then in the forest with the single edge (x, y) for any y, both x
and y get a probability of 0.6.
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aα
bα
F1
aβ
bα
F2
Figure 2:
probabilities. In the last paragraph of this section, we explain why symmetry may always be
assumed without loss of generality. We calculate the performance of the mechanism for each of
these forests.
Q(M;F1) = 2α,
Q(M;F2) = 2β + α
2
= β +
α
2
.
The quality ofM is at most the minimum of these two expressions. Clearly, we may replace β with
its highest possible value, 1− α, to get,
Q(M) ≤ min {2α, 1 − α/2} .
Choosing α which gives the highest minimum, we find that α = 2/5 and Q ≤ 4/5. We remark that
we can achieve this bound for any n. We just need to replace the two vertices in Figure 2 with two
n/2-stars.
There are two additional properties which we consider as desirable. The first is that the mech-
anism will be “fair”. It would be nice if we could require that the probability of a vertex only
depends on its progeny. It is not hard to see that this notion of fairness is too strong. For example,
start with the empty forest with n vertices. Then all the vertices get the same probability of 1/n.
If we add a single edge from x to y, then by IC x still gets 1/n, and by fairness, everyone other
than y should get just like x. This leaves a probability of at most 1/n for y. Using induction,
we can see that for any forest with a single star, the probability of the centre vertex is at most
1/n, which implies an infinitely decaying quality when n goes to infinity. We suggest the following
weaker notion of fairness.
Definition 4. Mechanism M is fair, if ∀F ∈ FN and ∀x, y ∈ R(F ),
a) (monotonicity) if P (x) > P (y), then M(x;F ) ≥M(y;F );
b) (proportionality) the ratio M(x;F )/M(y;F ) depends only on P (x;F ), P (y;F ).
Monotonicity means that the root of a larger sub-tree gets at least the probability of the root of a
smaller sub-tree. Proportionality implies in particular that the ratioM(x)/M(y) is not influenced
by edges outside of T (x), T (y), nor by the internal structure of T (x), T (y). In order for the ratio
M(x)/M(y) to be well-defined, we must also require that the mechanism is positive (i.e., that all
the vertices get a positive probability). We can relax this requirement by taking the closure of all
positive, fair mechanisms. More precisely, let {Mi}i∈N be an infinite series of mechanisms. We
say that {Mi} converges to mechanism M if for every forest F ∈ N and every vertex x ∈ N ,
M(x;F ) = lim
i→∞
Mi(x;F ). We say that M is fair in limit if there is a series of positive, fair
mechanisms which converge to M. If mechanism M is fair in limit, then it can be approximated
with a fair mechanism.
The second desirable feature is that of being exact.
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Definition 5. Mechanism M is exact if for every forest F ∈ FN , M(∅, F ) = 0.
In other words, exactness means that the probabilities assigned byM always sum up to exactly
1. A mechanism which is not exact can only improve its quality, if it will distribute the extra
probability; however, the IC requirement might prevent it from doing so.
Let x, y ∈ N be such that there is an automorphism of F that takes x to y. A symmetric
mechanism is one for which, under these conditions, M(x;F ) = M(y;F ). Any mechanism can
be converted to a symmetric mechanism by picking a random automorphism of F before using
the original mechanism. If the original mechanism was IC/fair/exact and with quality Q, then
the symmetric mechanism will possess these features as well. This is why we allowed ourselves to
assume in the proof of Proposition 3 that a general mechanism is symmetric. This observation will
also be useful to us in the proof of our impossibility theorem (Section 4). Another implication is
that our two mechanisms, which are not symmetric, can be made symmetric without hurting any
of their properties.
2.1 Conventions and notations
As in previous figures, we use circles to denote the vertices in our diagrams. The label of the vertex
is marked inside the circle. In the forthcoming diagrams, a k-star is represented by a diamond,
with ‘k’ denoted below it. The label inside the diamond is for the centre of the star, and an edge
between two diamonds translates to an edge between the centre vertices of the corresponding stars.
For example, the tree in Figure 3 is equivalent to F2 in Figure 1.
a
3
b
3
Figure 3:
When we draw a forest we might add dashed lines and vary the length of the edges so that every
vertex is positioned in a distance from the left which is proportional to its progeny. For example,
looking at the forest in Figure 4 it is clear, both graphically and numerically, that P (x1) < P (y1) <
P (x2) and that P (x3) = P (y4). We emphasize that the dashed lines are not part of the description
of the forest and serve only for visualization purposes.
x1
4
x2
2
x3
4
y1
5
y2
3
y3 y4
Figure 4:
3 Two mechanisms
In this section we present our two novel mechanisms. To that end we use a few simple observations.
Notice that the progeny of any vertex is exactly one more than the sum of progenies of its direct
sons. This implies the following.
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Observation 6.
a) The progeny of any vertex x is the highest in its sub-tree, T (x); the highest progeny in the
forest is achieved by at least one of the roots.
b) The highest progeny in T (x)\{x} is achieved by at least one of the direct sons of x.
c) Let y, z ∈ T (x)\{x} be two different vertices. Assume that P (y) ≥ 12P (x), P (z) ≥ 12P (x).
Then there must be a path between y and z.4 If the path is from y to z, then P (z) ≥ P (y)+1,
and vice versa.
We add the notation P (x) = max
y∈T (x)\{x}
P (y), for the highest progeny in T (x), excluding x.
3.1 A fair mechanism
For our first mechanism we need to assume a total ordering of the vertices by their progenies. We
achieve this ordering by breaking ties lexicographically. Hence we will write P (x) ≻ P (y) ⇐⇒
(P (x) > P (y)) ∨ ((P (x) = P (y)) ∧ (x < y)). Let R = {r1, r2, . . . , r|R|} be a decreasing ordering of
the roots by ≻, i.e., P (ri) ≻ P (ri+1) for all i. We denote by ri(F ′) the i-th root in the forest F ′.
Remember that we denote by P ∗ = P (r1) the highest progeny in F .
The idea behind our first mechanism is first to recognize the subset of vertices which will get a
positive probability (i.e., the support of the mechanism). We need to make sure that this subset is
IC and contains only vertices with high progeny. The second step is to set IC probabilities on this
subset such that the probabilities are high enough to get a good quality, but not too high as to not
distribute more than 1. Specifically, we define the set
A := {x ∈ N : x = r1(Fx)}.
That is, A is the set of vertices x such that in the graph Fx, x has the highest progeny (including
tie-breaking). Notice that this definition is incentive-compatible in the sense that x ∈ A(F ) ⇐⇒
x ∈ A(Fx), which means that the out-edge of x does not affect the decision of whether or not it
belongs to A.
We use Corollary 2 and define our mechanism as the IC extension of a roots-distribution mecha-
nism. It is not hard to see that if r1 is the only root with a positive probability, we get a mechanism
for which the support is precisely the set A (this can be observed directly from the definition of
A). We thus define the following roots-distribution:
Mf (r1) =


1
2
, |A| = 1
1
2
log2
P (r1)
P (r1)
, |A| ≥ 2
∀r ∈ R\{r1}, Mf (r) = 0,
and we extend it to an IC mechanism which we also denote Mf .
Before proving the exact properties of Mf (Theorem 11), we demonstrate its workings with a
couple of examples. Example 7 is intended to give the intuition that Mf is well-defined; i.e., that∑
x∈AMf (x) ≤ 1. Example 8 is intended to give the intuition that
∑
x∈AMf (x) ≥
1
2
. Since
4Otherwise, there is a vertex w ∈ T (x) with a path Py from y to w and a path Pz from z to w and Py ∩Pz = {w}.
This implies that P (w) ≥ 1 + P (y) + P (z) ≥ 1 + P (x), in contradiction to a).
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∀x ∈ A,P (x) ≥ 12P ∗,5 this readily implies that Q(Mf ) ≥ 1/4 (though in Theorem 11 we prove a
better bound).
Example 7. Consider the forest in Figure 5. If we remove the out-edge of b, we get the forest Fb, in
which b has the highest progeny. That is, b = r1(Fb). In Fb there is no other vertex which can be the
root of the largest tree when we remove its out-edge, hence A(Fb) = {b}. Thus,Mf (b) = 1
2
. For 1 ≤
i ≤ 4, ci = r1(Fci) and A(Fci) = {b, c1, . . . , ci}. Hence, Mf (ci) =
1
2
log2
P (ci)
P (ci)
=
1
2
log2
6 + i
6 + i− 1 .
We now get that
∑
x∈N
Mf (x) = 1
2
+
1
2
4∑
i=1
log2
6 + i
6 + i− 1 =
1
2
+
1
2
log2
10
6
< 1.
a
4
b
2
c1 c2 c3 c4
d
5
Figure 5:
The thing to notice in Example 7 is that the last vertex in A gets a probability of at most 1/2,
and the sum of probabilities for the rest of the vertices is at most
1
2
log2
P ∗
1
2P
∗
=
1
2
. Hence the
mechanism is well-defined.
Example 8. In Figure 6, Mf (a) = 0 since in the forest Fa it is only a second-highest root. In Fb,
b is the highest root and the second highest root is d with progeny 3. Although vertex a is not in A,
it would be after we remove the out-edge of b. Thus, A(Fb) = {b, a}, and Mf (b) = 1
2
log2
P (b)
P (a)
=
1
2
log2
7
4
. Similarly, we find that Mf (c) = 1
2
log2
9
7
and Mf (d) = 1
2
log2
10
9
. Hence,
∑
x∈N
Mf (x) = 1
2
log2
10
4
>
1
2
.
a
4
b
3
c
2
d
Figure 6:
5If P (x) < 1
2
P ∗ then in Fx there is a tree of order P
∗ − P (x) > P (x) and x cannot be the root with the highest
progeny.
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In Example 8 no vertex gets the fixed probability of 1/2. This happens because vertex b, which
is the last vertex in A, is not the only vertex in A(Fb). In this case the second vertex in A(Fb) (i.e.,
vertex a) has a progeny lower than 12P
∗(F ). Hence the total probabilities in this kind of forests is
at least
1
2
log2
P ∗
1
2P
∗
=
1
2
.
Proceeding to a formal analyse of mechanism Mf , we first give an alternative definition of the
set A (Claim 9) and an explicit description of the mechanism’s distribution (Lemma 10).
Claim 9. The following is an alternative definition of A:
A = {x ∈ T (r1) : P (x) ≻ max{12P (r1), P (r2)}}.6
Proof. If x /∈ T (r1) then clearly x is not in the largest tree in Fx, and x /∈ A. If x ∈ T (r1) and
P (x) ≺ 12P (r1), then in Fx, P (r1(F );Fx) = P ∗ − P (x) ≻ P (x), which means that x 6= r1(Fx).
Likewise, if x ∈ T (r1) and P (x) ≺ P (r2) then P (r2(F );Fx) = P (r2(F );F ) ≻ P (x;F ) = P (x;Fx),
and again x 6= r1(Fx).
For the other direction, assume that x ∈ T (r1) and P (x) ≻ max{12P (r1), P (r2)}. Assume for
contradiction that there is a vertex y such that P (y;Fx) ≻ P (x;Fx). If y /∈ T (r1) then P (y;Fx) ≤
P (r2;F ) which is a contradiction. If y ∈ T (r1) then by Observation 6 there is a path between x and
y. Since P (y;F ) ≥ P (y;Fx) ≻ P (x), this path is from x to y; but then P (y;Fx) = P (y)− P (x) 
1
2P (r1) ≺ P (x), which is again a contradiction.
From Claim 9 and Observation 6 we conclude that A is a path. Denote A = {r1 = a|A|, . . . , a1}.
Lemma 10. The support of Mf (F ) is A(F ). Furthermore,
a) If |A| = 1 then Mf (r1) = 1
2
.
b) If |A| = k ≥ 2 then
1 < ∀i ≤ k, Mf (ai) = 1
2
log2
P (ai)
P (ai−1)
,
1
2
log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
≤Mf (a1) ≤ 1
2
.
Proof. The fact that supp(Mf ) = A is immediate from the definitions of A and Mf ; and so is
claim a).
Suppose that k ≥ 2. Since A is a path, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ k, ai−1 is the vertex with the largest progeny
in T (ai)\{ai}. Clearly this is still true in Fai , hence P (ai−1) = P (ai;Fai). From the definition of
Mf we get that Mf (ai) =Mf (ai;Fai) =
1
2
log2
P (ai)
P (ai;Fai)
=
1
2
log2
P (ai)
P (ai−1)
.
For the lower bound on Mf (a1), notice that P (a1) ≺ max{12P (r1), P (r2)}, otherwise we would
have had another vertex in A. If P (a1) < max{P ∗ − P (a1), P (r2)}, then A(Fa1) = {a1}, and
Mf (a1) = 1
2
=
1
2
log2
2P ∗
P ∗
≥ 1
2
log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
.7 If P (a1) ≥ max{P ∗−P (ak), P (r2)}, thenMf (a1) =
1
2
log2
P (a1)
P (a1)
>
1
2
log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
.8 For the upper bound, notice that if |A| ≥ 2 then P (r1) ≥ 1
2
P ∗,
hence the mechanism never assigns a probability higher than 1/2 to a single vertex.
6P (x) ≻ 1
2
P (r1) ⇐⇒ ((P (x) >
1
2
P (r1)) ∨ ((P (x) =
1
2
P (r1)) ∧ (x < r1)).
7This is the case with vertex b in Example 7.
8This is the case with vertex b in Example 8.
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We can now prove the main theorem for mechanismMf . The fact thatMf is well-defined is an
easy corollary of Lemma 10 and the exact quality is proved by a standard analysis. To prove that
this mechanism is fair in limit we build a series of fair mechanisms that converge to our mechanism.
Theorem 11. Mechanism Mf is well-defined, IC, fair (in limit), and with quality Q(Mf ) ≥
1/ ln 16 ≈ 0.36.
Proof. The mechanism is IC by definition. If |A| = 1 then only r1 has a positive probability of
Mf (r1) = 1
2
; and if |A| = k ≥ 2,
∑
x∈N
Mf (x) =
k∑
i=1
Mf (ai) ≤ 1
2
k∑
i=2
log2
P (ai)
P (ai−1)
+
1
2
=
1
2
log2
P ∗
P (a1)
+
1
2
≤ 1
2
log2
P ∗
1
2P
∗
+
1
2
= 1,
which shows that this mechanism is well-defined. We turn to bound Q(Mf ). If |A| = 1, then
clearly Q(Mf ;F ) = 1/2. Suppose that |A| ≥ 2. Using Lemma 10 we get,
E[P (x)]x∼Mf (F ) >
1
2
k∑
i=2
P (ai) log2
P (ai)
P (ai−1)
+
1
2
P (a1) log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
=
1
2 ln 2
k∑
i=2
P (ai)
∫ P (ai)
P (ai−1)
dz
z
+
1
2
P (a1) log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
≥ 1
2 ln 2
k∑
i=2
∫ P (ai)
P (ai−1)
dz +
1
2
P (a1) log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
=
1
2 ln 2
k∑
i=2
(P (ai)− P (ai−1)) + 1
2
P (a1) log2
2P (a1)
P ∗
=
1
2 ln 2
(
P ∗ − P (a1) + P (a1) ln 2P (a1)
P ∗
)
=
P ∗
2 ln 2
(
1 +
P (a1)
P ∗
ln
2P (a1)
eP ∗
)
.
Since the function z ln(2z/e) is monotone increasing in the interval [0.5,1], we get that
E[P (x)]x∼Mf (F ) ≥
P ∗
2 ln 2
(
1 +
1
2
ln
1
e
)
=
P ∗
4 ln 2
,
as claimed.
It remains to show that Mf is fair (i.e., monotone and proportional). For any two vertices x, y ∈
R(F ) with P (x) > P (y), it must be that Mf (y) = 0, hence it is monotone. To see that it is
proportional, define for any ǫ > 0 the mechanism Mǫ induced by the following roots-mechanism:
∀r ∈ R, Mǫ(r) =Mf (r1)ǫP ∗−P (r).
It is easy to see that Mǫ → Mf when ǫ → 0. Notice that for any two roots r, r′, Mǫ(r)Mǫ(r′) =
ǫP (r
′)−P (r). Since this relation depends only on P (r), P (r′), Mǫ is proportional; hence, Mf is fair
in limit.
Both Examples 7 and 8 show thatMf is not exact. Our next mechanism is an exact mechanism,
but not fair.
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3.2 An exact mechanism
Consider the forest in Figure 7. Denote T1, T2, T3 for the largest, second largest and smallest trees,
respectively. The vertical dotted line denotes the middle of T1 (which is P
∗/2 = 5).
a0
2
a1
4
a2
2
a3
2
3
b1
3
b2
2
c1
8
Figure 7:
Consider the following mechanism, M′, which is exact but not IC. The support of M′ are all
the vertices which are to the right of the dotted line (namely, a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, c1). The idea is to
take the interval (12P
∗, P ∗] = (5, 10] and partition it into subintervals. Each vertex x ∈ supp(M′)
gets ownership on the subinterval (max{12P ∗, P (x)}, P (x)]. It is possible that several vertices from
different trees will claim ownership of a subinterval, in this case the ownership on this subinterval is
equally shared between them. In the example of Figure 7, a1 owns the subinterval (
1
2P
∗, P (a1)] =
(5, 6] in T1; b1 owns the subinterval (5, 7] in T2; and c1 owns the subinterval (5, 8] in T3. Thus, the
subinterval (5, 6] is co-owned by the three of them and each gets a share of 1/3 of this subinterval.
Similarly, (6, 7] is shared between a2, b1, c1; (7, 8] is shared between a2, b2, c1. The subinterval (8, 9]
is shared by only two vertices (because P (c1) ≤ 8): a3 and b2. Finally, the subinterval (9, 10] in
owned by a3 alone. Now each subinteral (α, β] divides a probability of log2
β
α
among the partners
who own it. We get the following distribution:
M′(a1) = 1
3
log2
6
5
M′(a2) = 1
3
log2
7
6
+
1
3
log2
8
7
M′(a3) = 1
2
log2
9
8
+ log2
10
9
M′(b1) = 1
3
log2
7
5
M′(b2) = 1
3
log2
8
7
+
1
2
log2
9
8
M′(c1) = 1
3
log2
8
5
The sum of the probabilities distributed by the subintervals is the probability that would be dis-
tributed by the whole interval (12P
∗, P ∗] which is precisely log2
P ∗
1
2P
∗
= 1. This shows that this
mechanism is exact. The problem, as mentioned, is that it is not IC. To see that, notice that in
the forest Fa1 , the middle line drops to 4.5 (since now P
∗(Fa1) = P (b2) = 9). This means that
a1 owns a larger subinterval in Fa1 , which means higher probability. Similar problem can be for
vertices which are in T1 right below the middle (but above
1
3P
∗)—removing their out-edge might
drop the middle so that they are entitled to some positive probability. If we want our mechanism
to be IC we must award them these additional probabilities. The compensation will come from the
probability of r1 (a3 in our example): this vertex will not get his “fair share” of the interval but
instead will get a probability which completes the total distribution to 1. Of course, we will have
to prove that these corrections do not sum up to more than 1 themselves (or equivalently, that the
“complementary probability” is never negative).
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We turn to the formal definition of our exact mechanism, Mb. For any real number z > 0, we
define u(z) = |{r ∈ R : P (r) ≥ z}|. As with the previous mechanism, we define Mb by defining it
only for roots:
∀i > 1, Mb(ri) =


1
ln 2
∫ P (ri)
max{P (ri),
1
2P
∗}
dz
zu(z)
, P (ri) >
1
2P
∗,
0, P (ri) ≤ 12P ∗.
Mb(r1) = 1−Mb(N\{r1}).
We illustrate the workings of this mechanism for the forest in Figure 7.
Example 12. All the vertices (in all trees) to the right of the middle dotted line get a positive
probability. The vertices to the left of this line in trees other than T1 get a zero probability. The
vertex a0 gets a zero probability as well since in the graph Fa0 the middle drops down a little, but it
is still above P (a0). It is clear from the diagram that
u(z) =


3, z ≤ 8,
2, 8 < z ≤ 9,
1, 9 < z ≤ 10.
The vertices a2, b1, b2, c1 get the same probabilities as we calculated for the mechanism M′. To find
the probability of a1, consider the forest Fa1 .
Here P ∗(Fa1) = P (b2) = 9; hence the middle dropped to 4.5. We can now calculate,
Mb(a1) = 1
3
log2
P (a1)
1
2P
∗(Fa1)
=
1
3
log2
6
4.5
.
Finally, the probability of a3 is the remaining probability which completes the total distribution to
1. Since Mb,M′b are exact and the only differences between them are the probabilities of a1 and
a3, we get that
Mb(a3) =M′(a3)− (Mb(a1)−M′(a1)) = 1
2
log2
9
8
+ log2
10
9
− 1
3
log2
6
4.5
+
1
3
log2
6
5
.
If we just wanted to prove that Mb(F ) is well-defined, it was enough to show that Mb(a1) −
M′b(a1) ≤ M′b(a3). Notice also that if the two largest trees were of the same order (i.e., P (b2) =
P (a3)), then we would have P
∗(Fa1) = P (b2) = P
∗(F ) and in this caseMb(a1) =M′b(a1) (because
the middle line, and hence the subinterval of a1, does not change when we remove the out-edge of
a1). This implies that when the two largest trees are of the same order, Mb(r1) =M′b(r1) (i.e., r1
gets his “fair share”), and all we need to show is that when we lower down the order of the second
largest tree, the compensations for the vertices in T1 near the middle are never larger than the
probability of r1 underM′b. The following is our formal claim for the mechanismMb. The proof is
based on the above observation. Due to the length and technical nature of the proof, we postpone
it to the appendix.
Theorem 13. Mechanism Mb is well-defined, IC, exact, and with quality Q(Mb) ≥ 1/3.
We end this section by showing that Mb is not proportional, and hence not fair. Let F be a
forest with a k-star with centre c1 and a (k − 1)-star with centre c2. Assume that n = 3k. The
12
probabilities of c1, c2 are
Mb(c2) = 1
2
log2
k − 1
1
2k
=
1
2
(1− log2
k
k − 1),
Mb(c1) = 1−Mb(c2) = 1
2
(1 + log2
k
k − 1).
Now, if we add another (k − 1)-star (adding such a star does not involve any of the vertices in the
trees of c1, c2), then
Mb(c2) = 1
3
log2
k − 1
1
2k
=
1
3
(1− log2
k
k − 1).
Mb(c1) = 1− 2Mb(c2) = 1
3
(1 + 2 log2
k
k − 1).
We see that the ratio
Mb(c1)
Mb(c2) has changed, which means that Mb is not proportional.
4 An impossibility
In this section we prove the impossibility theorem stated below.
Theorem 14. Let M be an IC, fair and exact mechanism. Then Q(M) = 0.
Instead of dealing directly with the property of fairness, we prove that this property can be re-
placed with a more mathematically convenient property of being function-generated (Definition 15,
Lemma 16). We then prove a couple of asymptotic Lemmata (Lemma 17 and Lemma 18) that
together can be used to show that for any function-generated mechanism with a positive quality,
we can find a forest for which the mechanism is distributing probabilities that sum up to more
than one. This is the path with take in the proof of Theorem 19, which then immediately implies
Theorem 14.
Definition 15. An exact, IC mechanism M is function-generated if there is a series of positive
functions fn : N→ R+ such that for any F ∈ FN with |N | = n and r ∈ R(F ),
M(r) = fn(P (r;F ))∑
r′∈R(F ) fn(P (r
′;F ))

1− ∑
x∈N\R(F )
M(x;F )

 .
In other words, in a function-generated mechanism, the excess probability (i.e., the probability
left after distributing what is due by the IC demand) is linearly distributed between the roots
according to fn(P (·)).
Lemma 16. Let M be an IC, fair and exact mechanism. Then there is a function-generated
mechanism M′ such that M(F ) =M′(F ), for every forest F with at least three roots.
Proof. Fix n. For any 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, let Sk be the forest with a k-star and n − k − 1 isolated
vertices. Let ck be the centre vertex of the star and let zk be an isolated vertex in Sk. We define
the function f = fn in the following manner.
f(1) = 1;
∀2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, f(k) = M(ck;Sk)M(zk;Sk) .
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Since M is fair, f is well-defined. Let M′ be the IC mechanism generated by f . We will prove
the claim using induction on |E(F )|. The claim is clearly true for the empty forest. Suppose it
is true for all forests with e − 1 edges and let F be a forest with e edges. Since both M,M′
are IC, the induction hypothesis implies that M(x) = M′(x) for any x ∈ N\R.9 This means
that
∑
x∈N\RM(x) =
∑
x∈N\RM′(x), and since both mechanisms are also exact, we get that∑
x∈RM(x) =
∑
x∈RM′(x). Thus, it is enough to show that ∀x, y ∈ R,
M(x)
M(y) =
M′(x)
M′(y) . Denote
k = P (x),m = P (y). Since we assume that there are at least three roots, k +m < n. Let Sk,m
be the forest with one k-star, one m-star, and n − k −m − 2 isolated vertices. Let ck, cm be the
centre vertices of the k-star and m-star, respectively, and let z be an isolated vertex. From the
proportionality property of M we get
M(x;F )
M(y;F ) =
M(ck;Sk,m)
M(cm;Sk,m) =
M(ck;Sk,m)/M(z;Sk,m)
M(cm;Sk,m)/M(z;Sk,m) .
Now let zk, zm be isolated nodes in Sk, Sm, respectively. Then again by the proportionality property
of M,
M(ck;Sk,m)
M(z;Sk,m) =
M(ck;Sk)
M(zk, Sk) = f(k),
M(cm;Sk,m)
M(z;Sk,m) =
M(cm;Sm)
M(zm, Sm) = f(m).
Hence,
M(x;F )
M(y;F ) =
f(k)
f(m)
=
M′(x;F )
M′(y;F ) .
In light of Lemma 16, our goal is to show that if M is function-generated, then Q(M) = 0
(Theorem 19). To achieve this goal we prove two lemmata. The first, Lemma 17, states that a
function-generated mechanism with a positive quality is “convex at a distance”; meaning that for
any x1, x2 such that x1/x2 is large enough, fn(x1)/fn(x2) grows fast with n.
Lemma 17. Let M be a mechanism generated by the functions fn. Assume Q = Q(M) > 0. Then
for any k,m ∈ N such that m ≥ 2k/Q2, fn(m) = ω(nf(k)).
Proof. Fix k. We will show first that for any ℓ ≥ k√2/Q, f(ℓ) = Ω(nf(k)). If we show this, then
for any m ≥ 2k/Q2, we can use this claim twice and get that
f(m) ≥ f(2k/Q2) = Ω(nf(k
√
2/Q)) = Ω(n2f(k)) = ω(nf(k)).
Let F be the forest on n vertices with one ℓ-star and
n− ℓ
k
k-stars, with cℓ as the centre vertex of
the ℓ-star. Since,
Q ≤ Q(M;F ) ≤ ℓ ·M(cℓ) + k · (1−M(cℓ))
ℓ
≤M(cℓ)(1−Q/
√
2) +Q/
√
2,
we must have M(cℓ) = Ω(1). Using f to boundM(cℓ) we get
M(cℓ) ≤ f(ℓ)
f(ℓ) + n−ℓk · f(k)
=
1
1 + n−ℓk · f(k)f(ℓ)
= Ω(1)
=⇒ f(k)
f(ℓ)
= O
(
k
n− ℓ
)
= O(n−1),
as needed.
9Since Fx has one less edge and more root than F , the induction applies.
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x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
F1
x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
F2
x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
F3
x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
F4
x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
F5
x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
F6
Table 1:
Lemma 18, shows a specific structure of a tree which, under certain conditions, leads to an
over-distribution by a function-generated mechanism.
Lemma 18. Let M be a mechanism generated by the functions fn. Let F be the tree of four
connected stars as in Figure 8.
x1
b
x2
b
x3
a
x4
a
Figure 8:
Denote k =
fn(b)
fn(2a)
,m =
fn(a+ b)
fn(2a)
. Suppose that a = a(n), b = b(n) are such that: (1) b ≥ 2a, (2) fn(1)
fn(b)
= o(n−1), (3)m ≥ 7k2, (4) lim
n→∞
fn(a)
fn(2a)
= 0.
Then
∑
x∈N M(x;F ) ≥ (1− o(1))
(
1 +
1
48k
)
.
Proof. Consider the six sub-forests of F depicted in Table 1. Let f = fn. In each of these forests,
all the nodes in N\{x1, x2, x3, x4} have progeny 1, and their probabilities are at most f(1)f(b) . Hence
by property (2), the total probability of N\{x1, x2, x3, x4} is at most nf(1)f(b) = o(1). We will thus
ignore the probabilities of these nodes and assume they are actually zero.
We claim that f must be monotone non-decreasing; otherwise, let k > m be such that f(k) < f(m),
then
M(ck;Sk,m)
M(cm;Sk,m) =
f(k)
f(m)
< 1,
in contradiction to the monotonicity property of a fair mechanism. Thus, since 2b > b > 2a,
together with property (4), we get that
lim
n→∞
f(a)
f(b)
= lim
n→∞
f(a)
f(2b)
= 0.
Hence, in the forest F1, M(x3;F1) = M(x4;F1) = f(a)2f(a)+2f(b) = o(1), and similarly in F2,
M(x3;F2) ≤ f(a)2f(a)+f(2b) = o(1). Using the IC property we see that M(x3;F3) = M(x3;F1)
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and we can calculate that M(x1;F3) = f(b)f(2a)+2f(b) (1 − M(x3;F1)) = 1−o(1)2+k−1 . Again by IC,
M(x1;F4) =M(x1;F3), and M(x3;F4) =M(x3;F2). Using IC and f(2b) > f(a+ b), we get
M(x2;F ) =M(x2;F4) = f(2b)
f(2b) + f(2a)
(1−M(x1;F3)−M(x3;F2))
≥ 1
1 +m−1
(
1− 1− o(1)
2 + k−1
− o(1)
)
= (1− o(1)) 1 + k
−1
(1 +m−1)(2 + k−1)
. (1)
Below we calculate M(x3;F ) in a similar way without further elaboration.
M(x1;F6) =M(x1;F5) = f(b)
f(a) + f(b) + f(a+ b)
(1−M(x2;F1))
≤ 1− 1/2(1 − o(1))
1 + f(a+b)f(b)
=
1 + o(1)
2(1 +mk−1)
.
M(x2;F6) =M(x2;F2) = f(2b)
2f(a) + f(2b)
(1−M(x1;F1)) ≤ 1
2
.
M(x3;F ) =M(x3;F6) = f(a+ 2b)
f(a) + f(a+ 2b)
(1−M(x1;F6)−M(x2;F6))
≥ (1− o(1))
(
1− 1
2
− 1 + o(1)
2(1 +mk−1)
)
= (1− o(1)) mk
−1
2(1 +mk−1)
. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we get:
∑
x∈N
M(x;F ) ≥ (1− o(1))
(
1 + k−1
(1 +m−1)(2 + k−1)
+
mk−1
2(1 +mk−1)
)
.
Now, using property (3) and some algebra,
1 + k−1
(1 +m−1)(2 + k−1)
+
mk−1
2(1 +mk−1)
≥ 1 + k
−1
(1 + k−2/7)(2 + k−1)
+
7k
2(1 + 7k)
= 1 +
1
2
· 35k
3 − 14k2 − 11k − 2
98k4 + 63k3 + 21k2 + 9k + 1
,
and since k ≥ 1 (due to the monotonicity of f),
≥ 1 + 1
2
· 8k
3
192k4
= 1 +
1
48k
,
as claimed.
Theorem 19 is just a step away from Theorem 14.
Theorem 19. Let M be a function-generated mechanism. Then Q(M) = 0.
Proof. Assume that M is generated by functions fn and has quality Q = Q(M) > 0. Let y be
the smallest value in {y = 2i/Q2 : i ∈ N, i ≥ 1, fn(2y)
fn(y)
> n1/ log2(4/Q
2)}. By Lemma 17, for large
enough n, y ≤ 4/Q4, for otherwise
fn(4/Q
4)
fn(2/Q2)
≤
⌊log2(4/Q
2)⌋∏
i=1
fn(2
i+1/Q2)
fn(2i/Q2)
≤
(
n1/ log2(4/Q
2)
)⌊log2(4/Q2)⌋ ≤ n,
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in contradiction to the lemma with k = 2/Q2.
For two values a′, b′, let F (a′, b′) be the forest of Lemma 18 with a = a′, b = b′. Consider the set of
forests {Fi(y, (2+ i)y)}4/Q
2
i=0 . Denote also by ki,mi the values of k,m in Lemma 18 for Fi. We claim
that for all the forests in this set, we have properties (1), (2) and (4) of the lemma. Indeed, (1) is
trivial; since y ≥ 2/Q2, Lemma 17 implies property (2); and property (4) comes directly from the
definition of y.
To complete the proof we will show that there is a forest Fi such that mi ≥ 7k2i (i.e., property (3))
and ki is uniformly bounded from above. This will allow us to infer that M is over-distributing on
Fi.
Notice that k0 = 1, and for any i ≥ 1,
ki =
fn((2 + i)y)
fn(2y)
; mi =
fn((3 + i)y)
fn(2y)
= ki+1.
Suppose that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i, mj < 7k2j . Then,
mi =
mi
k0
=
i∏
j=0
mj
kj
< 7i+1
i∏
j=0
kj = 7
i+1
i−1∏
j=0
mj < 7
i+1 · 7i
i−1∏
j=0
k2j < 7
i+1 · 7i
i−2∏
j=0
m2j
< 7i+1 · 7i+2(i−1)
i−2∏
j=0
k4j < . . . < 7
i+1 · 7
∑i
j=1 j·2
i−j
k2
i
0 = 7
i+1+
∑i
j=1 j·2
i−j
. (3)
Hence if mj < 7k
2
j for all 0 ≤ j ≤ y/Q2, then m4/Q2 =
fn((4/Q
2 + 3)y)
fn(2y)
is finitely bounded
(remember that we bound y ≤ 4/Q4); but (4/Q
2 + 3)y
2y
>
2
Q2
, which for large enough n would lead
to a contradiction to Lemma 17.
Now let i be the first index such that mi ≥ 7k2i . Then we can put i = 4/Q4 in (3) to get a uniform
upper bound on ki = mi−1. Hence by Lemma 18,∑
x∈N
M(x;F ) ≥ (1− o(1))
(
1 +
1
48ki
)
> 1,
for n large enough.
Proof of Theorem 14. Basically, the proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 16 and Theorem 19.
However, the claim of Lemma 16 applies only to forests with at least three roots, whereas the proof
of Lemma 18 was based on forests with less than three roots. It is not hard, however, to see that
the proof will not suffer if we add to F two isolated vertices, thus the derivation is legitimate.
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A The proof for Mb
Proof of Theorem 13. MechanismMb is IC and exact by definition. For any x ∈ N , if P (x) < 13P ∗
then P ∗(Fx) >
2
3P
∗ > 2P (x) and Mb(x) = 0; hence supp(Mb) ⊆ {x ∈ N : P (x) ≥ 13P ∗} which
implies that Q(Mb) ≥ 13 . By definition Mb(ri) ≥ 0 for all i > 1. It remains to show that
Mb(r1) ≥ 0 for all forests.
Let F be any forest. It is easy to verify thatMb(r1) > 0 when P (r1) ≤ 12P ∗. We assume then that
P (r1) >
1
2P
∗. For every i > 1 with P (ri) >
1
2P
∗, supp(Mb) ∩ T (ri) = {x ∈ T (ri) : P (x) > 12P ∗},
and since 12P
∗ > 12P (ri), by Observation 6 supp(Mb) ∩ T (ri) is a path. This means that
Mb(T (ri)) = 1
ln 2
∑
x∈T (ri):P (x)>
1
2P
∗
∫ P (x)
max{P (x),
1
2P
∗}
dz
zu(z)
=
1
ln 2
∫ P (ri)
1
2P
∗
dz
zu(z)
,
which is independent of the internal structure of T (ri). In particular, Mb(r1) is independent of
the internal structure of T (r2) and we may assume that T (r2) is a P (r2)-star. For any positive
p ∈ R, let F (p) be the forest we get from F by replacing the tree T (r2) with a p-star.10 If
P (r2) is infinitesimally close to P
∗, then Mb(r1) = 1
ln 2
∫ P (r1)
P (r1)
dz
zu(z)
(see discussion paragraph
after Example 12). To find the probability of r1 in F we start with Mb(r1;F (P ∗)) and integrate
the changes in Mb(r1;F (p)) while lowering down p until we reach P (r2). More precisely, for
any x ∈ N, p ∈ R+ we define ∆(x) = ∆(x, p) = − d
dp
(Mb(x;F (p))). By definition of Mb(r1),
∆(r1)dp = −
∑
x 6=r1
∆(x)dp. Hence we can write,
Mb(r1) =Mb(r1;F (P (r2))) =Mb(r1;F (P ∗)) +
∫ P ∗
P (r2)
∆(r1)dp
=Mb(r1;F (P ∗))−
∑
x 6=r1
∫ P ∗
P (r2)
∆(x)dp.
We will evaluate the last expression in three intervals, starting with p > P (r1), continuing with
1
2P
∗ < p ≤ P (r1), and finally for p ≤ 12P ∗. In each interval we will find ∆(x) directly by taking an
infinitesimal δ > 0 and denoting p′ = p− δ. Then,
∆(x, p)dp =Mb(x;F (p′))−Mb(x;F (p)).
Let A(p) = {x ∈ N : P (x) = P ∗(Fx(p))} = {x ∈ T (r1) : P (x) ≥ max{p, 12P ∗}}. By Observation 6,
A is a path: {a1, . . . , ak = r1}. Let L(p) = supp(Mb;F (p))∩T (r1). Let ℓ be the set of leaves in L.
Since ∀x ∈ L, P (x) > 13P ∗, |ℓ| ≤ 2.11
1) p > P (r1). In this interval A = {r1}. There are at most three nodes except r1 which incur a
change in their probabilities under an infinitesimal decrease of p. The first is r2(F (p)), whose
progeny is decreased, and hence loses part of its probability. Since u(p) = 2 we have,
∆(r2)dp =Mb(r2;F (p′))−Mb(r2;F (p)) = 1
ln 2
(∫ p′
1
2P
∗
dz
zu(z)
−
∫ p
1
2P
∗
dz
zu(z)
)
=
1
2 ln 2
∫ p′
p
dz
z
= −1
2
log2
p
p′
.
10This star has ⌊p⌋ leaves and a centre vertex with value p− ⌊p⌋.
11If L has more than two leaves, then there is a “fork” in T1 with three leaves, each with progeny at least
1
3
P ∗.
This means that P (r1) ≥ P
∗ + 1, which is a contradiction.
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The nodes x ∈ ℓ, on the other hand, might gain extra probability due to the decrease in
P ∗(Fx(p)) (see the calculation of Mb(a1) in Example 12). That is, if p > P ∗ − P (x) then
P ∗(Fx(p)) = p and P
∗(Fx(p
′)) = p′. If in addition P (x) < 12p, then lowering p increases the
probability of x,
∆(x)dp =
1
ln 2
(∫ P (x)
1
2p
′
dz
zu(z;Fx(p′))
−
∫ P (x)
1
2 p
dz
zu(z;Fx(p))
)
=
1
ln 2
∫ 1
2p
1
2p
′
dz
zu(z;Fx(p))
=


1
u(12p)
log2
p
p′
, P ∗ − P (x) < 12p
1
u(12p) + 1
log2
p
p′
, P ∗ − P (x) ≥ 12p.
The difference between the two cases is that if P ∗−P (x) ≥ 12p then in Fx(p) there is another
tree with progeny at least 12p and hence u(
1
2p;Fx(p)) increases by one. Consider now the two
possibilities:
(a) If |ℓ| = 1, then we bound u(12p) ≥ 2 and get that ∆(ℓ)dp ≤
1
2
log2
p
p′
. Thus, in this case
∆(r2) + ∆(ℓ) ≤ 0. We conclude that if P (r2) > P (r1) and |ℓ| = 1, then
Mb(r1) ≥Mb(r1;F (P ∗)).
(b) If |ℓ| = 2, then we can bound u(12p) ≥ 3 and get that ∆(ℓ)dp ≤
2
3
log2
p
p′
. We conclude
that if P (r2) > P (r1) and |ℓ| = 2, then (∆(r2) + ∆(ℓ))dp ≤ 1
6
log2
p
p′
and
∫ P ∗
P (r2)
(∆(r2) + ∆(ℓ))dp ≤ 1
6
log2
P ∗
P (r2)
,
Mb(r1) ≥Mb(r1;F (P ∗))− 1
6
log2
P ∗
P (r2)
.
If P (r2) > P (r1) then for P (r2) ≤ z ≤ P ∗, u(z;F (P ∗)) = 2 and
Mb(r1;F (P ∗)) = 1
ln 2
∫ P (r1)
P (r1)
dz
zu(z;F (P ∗))
≥ 1
2 ln 2
∫ P ∗
P (r2)
dz
z
=
1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r2)
.
Thus, from the above two cases we get that if P (r2) > P (r1),
Mb(r1) ≥


1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r2)
, |ℓ| ≤ 1,
1
3
log2
P ∗
P (r2)
, |ℓ| = 2.
In any case, Mb(r1) > 0.
2) 12P
∗ < p ≤ P (r1). Taking P (r2) = P (r1) in the previous case, we get that
Mb(r1;F (P ∗))−
∑
x 6=r1
∫ P ∗
P (r1)
∆(x)dp ≥


1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
, |ℓ| ≤ 1,
1
3
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
, |ℓ| = 2.
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Suppose that p = P (r1) and A(p) = {a1, a2 = r1}. An infinitesimal decrease of p affects
the probabilities of r2 and ℓ just like before. There is another probability which changes
with p, namely the probability of a1. To evaluate ∆(a1) consider the forest Fa1 . Here
a1 = r1(Fa1) and p > P (a1). We therefore know from the previous case that ∆(a1) =
−∆(r2(Fa1(p));Fa1(p)) − ∆(ℓ(Fa1(p));Fa1(p)). Notice that ∆(r2) depends only on p; hence
it is the same in F (p) and Fa1(p):
∆(r2;F (p)) = ∆(r2(Fa1(p));Fa1(p)).
We get that ∑
x 6=r1
∆(x) = ∆(r2) + ∆(ℓ) + ∆(a1) = ∆(ℓ)−∆(ℓ(Fa1);Fa1).
We claim that ∆(ℓ(Fa1);Fa1) ≥ ∆(ℓ). To see that, let y ∈ ℓ(Fa1). Then Mb(y;Fa1) =
Mb(y;Fa1,y) > 0.12 If Mb(y) = Mb(y;Fy) 6= Mb(y;Fa1,y) then the reason could be one of
two:
(a) The first is when P (y) is above the middle in Fa1 but not in F ; that is, P
∗(Fa1,y) = p <
2P (y) < P ∗(Fy) = P
∗−P (y). In this case, Mb(y) = 0 =⇒ ∆(y) = 0. Since ∆(y;Fa1) >
0 (the probability of y increases when p drops), we get that ∆(y;Fa1) > ∆(y).
(b) The second is when both P (y;F ) > 0 and P (y;Fa1) > 0, but u(
1
2p;Fy) = u(
1
2p;Fa1,y)+1.
This happens when P (a1) − P (y) < 12p and P ∗ − P (a1) < 12p. Since u(12p;Fa1,y) <
u(12p;Fy) we get again that ∆(y;Fa1) > ∆(y).
This analysis remains true for all 12P
∗ < p ≤ P (r1), no matter the size of A. We conclude
that while 12P
∗ < p ≤ P (r1),
∑
x 6=r1
∆(x) ≤ 0; hence if P (r2) > 12P ∗ we still have
Mb(r1) ≥


1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
, |ℓ| ≤ 1,
1
3
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
, |ℓ| = 2.
3) p < 12P
∗. In this interval ∆(ℓ) = 0 since for y ∈ ℓ, P (y) < 12P ∗ and P ∗(Fy) = P ∗ − P (y) >
1
2P
∗ > p; hence the decrease in p will not influence Mb(y). It is possible that for some
ai ∈ A, ∆(ℓ(Fai);Fai) > 0, but as before, this only works to our advantage.13 In this interval
we also have ∆(r2) = 0. It might be, though, that ∆(r2(Fa1);Fa1) = ∆(r2;Fa1) < 0. This
happens when P (a1) < p <
1
2P
∗ and P (a1) < 2p. In this case ∆(a1)dp might be as high
as −∆(r2;Fa1)dp =
1
2
log2
p
p′
, as we have seen in case 1). The probability of r1 will only
be affected while p > 12P (r1); afterwards the next vertex in A will compensate for this
probability.14 Hence if |ℓ| = 1, then
Mb(r1) ≥ 1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
−
∫ 1
2P
∗
1
2P (r1)
∆(a1)dp ≥ 1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
− 1
2
log2
P ∗
P (r1)
= 0.
12The forest Fa1,y is the forest we get from F after removing the out-edges of a1 and y.
13That is, a drop in p would mean higher probability for ℓ(Fai) which means that ai loses probability and then r1
gains probability.
14And notice, as before, that r2(ai) is the same for all i and ∆(r2) only depends on p.
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To complete the proof we will show that if |A| ≥ 2 then while p > P (r1), |ℓ| = 1. Indeed
assume the opposite. Let x = argmin
x∈ℓ
P (x). Then p > P (r1) ≥ P (a1) > 2P (x). However,
then P (x) <
1
2
p ≤ 1
2
P ∗(Fx(p)) and Mb(x) = 0, in contradiction.
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